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Abstract 
The future of the multilateral trading system in a multi-polar world 
This paper assesses the future of the world trading system in the face of diminishing re-
turns from current multilateral trade negotiations and the proliferation of bilateral and re-
gional trade agreements (RTAs). It traces the evolution of the postwar trading regime from 
the early decades of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that were domi-
nated by the United States and the European Communities to the new World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) in which developing countries have begun to play a more important 
role, especially in the current Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs). 
The paper discusses the substantive and tactical reasons why the Doha Round has pro-
gressed so grudgingly and is unlikely to achieve its ambitious objectives. It then examines 
why developing countries increasingly have turned to RTAs to complement WTO talks, 
whether these pacts benefit or hinder MTNs, and how RTAs affect the influence of devel-
oping countries in the WTO. 
The final section of the paper looks at the WTO going forward and posits that, after the 
Doha Round, the trading system in the 21st century requires substantial reform. The prob-
lems of the Doha Round and the proliferation of regionalism confront WTO members with 
three central challenges: 
First, multilateralize multilateralism. There are a vast number of exceptions that take the 
WTO far away from the ideal of a universal system with a single set of rules. The paper 
suggests that officials focus on the broad exceptions to most-favored nation (MFN) and 
national treatment in Articles XX and XXI, especially the provisions covering border se-
curity and environmental issues. 
Second, multilateralize regionalism. The challenge is to make the design and implementa-
tion of RTAs more WTO-friendly. The paper calls for greater transparency of RTAs 
through more frequent and rigorous WTO reporting requirements, and new disciplines on 
discriminatory rules of origin. The paper offers two correctives: cut MFN tariffs and thus 
reduce the margin of preference for RTA members; or, alternatively, require that RTA 
members harmonize and lower the MFN tariffs down to the level of the lowest rate ap-
plied by any of the RTA members. 
Third, modernize multilateralism. The WTO agenda needs to be refocused on the prob-
lems of international commerce in the 21st century. WTO rules on taxes and subsidies 
need to be recast to cover concerns about currency manipulation, regulatory abuse or ne-
glect, and labor market practices as well as to meet the new challenges of climate change 
initiatives. In addition, WTO members will have to address trade and security linkages 
before pre-shipment inspection and visa requirements become major obstacles to interna-
tional flows of goods, services, and people. To do so, the WTO will have to collaborate 
more effectively with other international economic organizations. 
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1 Introduction 
On January 1, 2008, the World Trade Organization (WTO) celebrated its 13th birthday. 
Like any teenager, it confronts growing pains and awkward social adjustments as it ad-
dresses the new challenges of globalization in the 21st century. This paper examines the 
world trading system in this dynamic era. Particular attention is given to the interaction of 
the two major channels of trade negotiations in the global system: the Doha Round of mul-
tilateral trade negotiations, and regional trade agreements or RTAs.1 
The future of the multilateral trading system is a big topic and my analysis is accordingly 
highly condensed to meet the constraints of this short paper. I start with a brief discussion 
of the Doha Round, putting it into historical context, and then examine concerns about the 
proliferation of RTAs. I then summarize the extensive debate on whether regionalism 
complements or conflicts with the broad goals of the WTO system. In the final section, I 
outline three broad and interrelated initiatives that should be pursued to resolve the inter-
nal and external conflicts that risk diluting the WTO’s salience as a forum for international 
negotiation in the years ahead. 
2 The multilateral trading system in historical context 
The great triumph of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was creating a 
prosperous multi-polar trading system from the uni-polar system that emerged from World 
War II. The early decades of the GATT could be called the age of US enlightened self-
interest, in which the United States deployed inter alia generous development aid in tan-
dem with extensive liberalization of trade barriers protecting the US market to help rebuild 
the war-torn economies of Western Europe and thus provide a stable economic base for 
democratic governance and a reliable buffer against Soviet expansionism. 
In the early decades of the postwar era, US trade policies were generous to its former mili-
tary foes and strongly supported the evolving European Community. Similarly, in the 
GATT, US and European policy was generous to a fault to developing countries, permit-
ting them effectively to “free ride” on the trading system without undertaking substantive 
commitments to reduce barriers to their markets. US and European trade barriers came 
down sharply during the eight rounds of GATT negotiations, leaving only a small number 
of important trade restrictions that benefit well-entrenched domestic interest groups. Agri-
culture was a notable exception to this reformist movement, and textiles and clothing trade 
escaped the sharpest cuts until its armor-plated quota regime rusted away in 2005. 
But there is no such thing as a free lunch in the GATT cafeteria. The cost of non-
participation in the reciprocal negotiations (at least until the Uruguay Round) was signifi-
cant: the GATT Rounds often left intact major barriers imposed by industrial countries 
that restricted competitive agricultural and manufactured exports of developing countries. 
                                                 
1 I use the term “RTAs” to group together widely diverse trading arrangements that convey preferential 
status to exporters and investors in member country markets. The term encompasses traditional free 
trade agreements and customs unions as well as so-called “partial scope” agreements whose exceptions 
seemingly run counter to the spirit, if not the letter, of world trade rules. 
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Thus, developing countries protected their own markets, but in turn had to accept the 
maintenance of high foreign trade barriers against their most competitive exports. Though 
such policies never yielded big economic rewards, they were politically convenient. Many 
developing countries relied on protected home markets and commodity exports to support 
modest growth; some followed a strategy of export-led growth and became platforms for 
the assembly and export of light manufactures. Their success in turn provoked a wave of 
new protectionism in developed markets via so-called voluntary export restraints, anti-
dumping and countervailing duties, and special protection regimes like the Multi-Fiber 
Arrangement. 
The Uruguay Round (1986–1994) deviated from this pattern by requiring that all the is-
sues under negotiation be considered part of a “single undertaking” to which all partici-
pants had to commit. This procedural rule dramatically reversed past negotiating dynam-
ics. Developing countries could no longer be “free riders” as in past rounds. The addition 
of a proposal in the middle of the Uruguay Round to strengthen the institutional structure 
of the trading system by establishing a new World Trade Organization (WTO) under-
scored the importance of the single undertaking. Suddenly, developing countries had to 
accept the full complement of obligations (albeit with some special and differential treat-
ment) included in the Uruguay Round package to qualify for membership in the new 
WTO. Saying no to the Uruguay Round accords was not an option, since all the big trad-
ing powers were switching to the new club. Changing institutions put developing countries 
in a unique and disadvantageous position and explains why they had to undertake com-
mitments in some areas (e.g., intellectual property) that couldn’t be fully implemented and 
enforced. The WTO was thus born with a “development deficit”, one of several birth de-
fects analyzed in a number of early WTO assessments (see, for example, Schott 2000). 
Note, however, that in current WTO negotiations the single undertaking now gives devel-
oping countries some leverage to push their own export interests – if US and EU officials 
do not address their priority demands, then they could simply prevent the Doha Round 
deal from closing. In a 180 degree reversal from the Uruguay Round precedent noted 
above, the single undertaking gives developing countries a stick in the closet; like most 
sticks, it is most valuable if threatened but not used. 
3 Why has the Doha Round Proceeded so Slowly? 
In November 2001, WTO member countries agreed to launch a new round of global trade 
negotiations and christened it the Doha Development Agenda. This odd name was meant 
to distinguish the venture from the Uruguay Round and emphasize that developing coun-
try interests were to be given priority. Of course, all GATT/WTO rounds seek to advance 
development objectives, and all have granted exceptions to developing countries that ease 
or exempt them from the liberalization and rulemaking obligations in the package of 
agreements. But in light of the heavy load of new commitments undertaken by developing 
countries in the Uruguay Round, many countries argued that they deserved compensatory 
treatment in the next round…and thus interpreted the Doha mandate as an entitlement 
policy in which the negotiations were about concessions developed countries would make 
to developing countries – and not what developing countries needed to contribute to the 
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exercise to benefit both themselves, other developing countries, and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) world.2 
Six years later, the Doha Round seems likely to underachieve, if it succeeds at all. Nego-
tiators have traversed numerous crises and tolerated the tactical games that diplomats in-
variably play to cope with the boredom of Geneva winters. But they haven’t done a lot of 
actual negotiating! 
There are many reasons why the Doha Round has progressed so grudgingly. Some of the 
problems reside in the complex issues on the trade negotiating agenda, but the most diffi-
cult challenges transcend the responsibilities of trade ministers and emanate from the eco-
nomic and political environment in which trade policy operates. This topic alone merits its 
own paper; instead, let me offer a few key reasons for the Doha doldrums. 
First, and most important, the global economic and political environment has become in-
creasingly unsettled over the course of the Doha Round due to both adjustment pressures 
emanating from globalization (including growing competition from China) and new secu-
rity requirements that complicate and raise the cost of international commerce. Globaliza-
tion pressures make policymakers more cautious about taking on additional adjustments 
via the Doha Round when they are already having a hard time coping with existing com-
petition. However, they also recognize that they must adapt quickly to changing condi-
tions in world markets or fall sharply behind in the global competition for market shares 
and investment resources, so protection is not a long-term option. On balance, this “glob-
alization imperative” has made WTO members more risk averse to multilateral trade re-
form in the Doha Round (though some countries have pursued more targeted liberalization 
via RTAs). 
Second, there is a sizeable gap in the ability of countries to participate actively in WTO 
deliberations. Resource constraints are real, and many developing countries allocate their 
representation to regional bodies that offer more immediate pay-offs in terms of unilateral 
trade preferences. Unfortunately, this leads to foot-dragging in the WTO. Furthermore, 
developing countries have been unsure whether they could take advantage of new trading 
opportunities in the Doha Round due to infrastructure and human capital constraints. 
These legitimate concerns underscore the need to follow through on trade facilitation re-
forms in the Doha Round and complementary commitments to “Aid for Trade” to 
strengthen economic infrastructure and administrative capabilities.3 Trade and integration 
arrangements should also be part of the policy response and integrally linked with a coun-
try’s development strategy (though not necessarily the main driver of that strategy). 
Third, the foreign policy imperative to work together – which solidified global support to 
start the Doha Round two months after the tragic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 – 
has frayed amid frictions over US policy in Iraq, increasing competitive pressures from 
China, and renewed concerns about energy security and nuclear proliferation. The coop-
erative spirit of Doha, forged by the crisis of the moment, seems to be a fading memory. In 
                                                 
2 For more discussion on this point, see the section titled “Misconstrued development round” in my in-
vited column, “Unlocking the benefits of world trade”, The Economist, 1 November 2003, 65–67. 
3 For an analysis of the benefits of trade facilitation for economic development, see Wilson / Mann / 
Otsuki (2003). 
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its place, trade officials offer a cacophony of diplomatic rhetoric known in Geneva as “the 
blame game.” 
Fourth, success in the Doha Round is complicated by the legacy of previous GATT 
rounds. The GATT era substantially reduced border barriers to manufactured imports in 
both the United States and Europe. In the mercantilist calculus of the WTO, all that US 
and EU officials have left to “give” are reforms of restrictions that have survived eight 
previous negotiating rounds over the past 50 years. Obviously, such protection is deeply 
rooted in domestic politics and will be hard to dislodge. Some political observers question 
whether WTO members can offer sufficient inducements to get the transatlantic powers to 
liberalize, especially in agriculture. 
Fifth, WTO members made a huge tactical mistake in requiring that progress on agricul-
ture precede negotiations in other areas. The rationale was clear: farm reforms lagged in 
past rounds and needed to “catch up” in the Doha Round. In the event, focusing on agri-
culture effectively delayed negotiations across the entire Doha agenda. Progress on agri-
culture has been insufficient to spur worthwhile offers on manufactures and services; 
many of the big emerging-market countries that will enjoy the most growth over the next 
decade – China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Thailand – remain wary, and 
justifiably so, that key US and EU farm reforms will be excluded or subject to lengthy de-
ferment in the Doha Round negotiations. Because they believe the farm trade talks are 
“unbalanced” – demanding too much from them and too little from the United States and 
the European Union – they have held back in talks to liberalize trade in other areas. Yet 
without contributions by at least the middle-income developing countries on industrial 
products and services, officials in many OECD countries cannot garner political support 
for a deal to sharply reduce farm subsidies and border protection. Geneva officials say this 
is a “chicken and egg” problem. In fact, it is a lame excuse for not taking responsibility – 
which, in other words, means lack of political will. 
Sixth, policymakers in the United States and Europe face growing resistance to new trade 
liberalization. US trade politics is dominated by China bashing; several bills have been 
introduced in Congress to respond and counter the undervaluation of the renminbi, includ-
ing invoking WTO dispute settlement under GATT Article XV, and to impose antidump-
ing and countervailing duties with more intensity against imports from China. In Europe, 
member states continue to grapple with the impact and adjustment pressures generated by 
enlargement, and with implementing the structural reforms of the Lisbon Agenda. Anti-
dumping measures are being deployed with increasing frequency to blunt import growth 
from East Asia, particularly in the areas of textiles, apparel, and footwear. Investment 
policies are being contorted to develop national champions – and some member states 
seem to only want competition among national champions when it comes to the football 
pitch! 
On both sides of the pond, China bashing has become allied with renewed calls for eco-
nomic nationalism, the blood brother of trade protectionism. In the United States, public 
outcries doomed both the Chinese purchase of UNOCAL and Dubai Ports World’s 
planned investment in East Coast seaports. It’s not hard to see how the current clamor 
could turn into calls for national ownership of strategic assets, and in turn provide a politi-
cal excuse to block reforms involving establishment in goods and services industries. In-
vestments by sovereign wealth funds, especially those from the Middle East and East 
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Asia, could provoke nationalistic outbursts reminiscent of the Dubai Ports World saga of 
2006 (see Graham / Marchick 2006). China already has faced this challenge in the energy 
sector. My fear is that other sectors will be classified as “strategic” and targeted for protec-
tion – including information technology and telecommunications as well as energy pro-
duction and distribution. 
Rampant China bashing in both the United States and Europe could provoke tit-for-tat 
trade retaliation, which in turn could disrupt the Doha Round. While existing WTO obli-
gations constrain the use of traditional forms of trade protection like tariffs and quotas, the 
protectionist backlash could surface in more subtle ways such as clawing back of prior re-
form via new regulatory policies. We already have seen some examples in restrictions 
blocking trade in genetically modified foods and in security-related investment restric-
tions. 
The above incomplete list entails formidable obstacles to reaching agreement in the Doha 
Round. A deal is still doable in 2008; the terms already are imbedded in the chairman’s 
drafts circulating in Geneva and can be extracted with a modicum of diplomatic skill. But 
the ambitious objectives of Doha 2001 will not be met – too much time has been wasted 
and too little negotiation pursued to expect major changes in current policies. However, 
the Doha Round can still be useful if it can lock in the incremental gains achieved to date 
and set the table for the early resumption of more substantive talks on a broader agenda 
(which I outline in the last section of this paper). 
4 Doha fallbacks 
If multilateral trade liberalization stalls, WTO members have two mutually-reinforcing 
options: unilateral liberalization and regional trade integration. Economists will tell you 
that unilateral liberalization is good and that unilateral liberalization combined with recip-
rocal reforms by one’s trading partners is even better. In fact, the combined approach has 
been deployed successfully for some time, as the results of prior GATT rounds and re-
gional integration arrangements have been coupled with self-serving unilateral liberaliza-
tion.4 
But the unilateral reform engine may now be running on fumes. While average applied 
tariffs in developing countries have been cut well below the rates bound in the Uruguay 
Round, they still are in the 10 to 20 % range for many countries. There are good political 
economy reasons why liberalization seems to fade as applied rates decline. To cut the 
“muscle” of protection, government officials need a big political counterforce to the strong 
lobbies benefiting from subsidies or barriers to imports. Such a political coalition can only 
be put together with results from a big reciprocal negotiation involving concessions from 
foreign suppliers of value to domestic industry – thus the continuing interest in bilateral 
and regional trade talks. 
                                                 
4 According to World Bank (2005), unilateral liberalization accounted for almost two-thirds of the aver-
age weighted tariff cuts implemented by developing countries over the period 1983–2003. 
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For developing countries, RTAs have become increasingly important, especially given the 
low expectations that the Doha Round can fulfill its development objectives. Given the 
lackluster pace of the WTO talks, and the ongoing challenges posed by globalization and 
competition from China and India, many developing countries have turned to RTAs to 
complement and often propel domestic economic reforms. If properly crafted, RTAs can 
contribute to economic growth by spurring competition in domestic markets and dampen-
ing inflation – which in turn helps create a more stable and attractive environment for in-
vestment. Indeed, competition for investment drives many of the RTAs to which develop-
ing countries participate. If a country maintains high levels of protection, costly regula-
tions, or discriminatory standards, investors generally will opt to locate in other countries 
that have policies more conducive to production and investment. 
Note that the access to trade preferences is generally not an important driver, particularly 
in North-South RTAs where industrial countries maintain only a few albeit significant 
border barriers to developing country exports. Preferential access is important for some 
products (e. g., agriculture; autos; apparel), but RTAs often limit or exempt those products 
from free trade commitments. Moreover, preferences are depreciating assets whose value 
declines as WTO negotiations and/or other RTAs are concluded. 
5 Regionalism and the world trading system 
Bilateral and regional trade arrangements have coexisted with the GATT/WTO since the 
launch of the postwar trading system. Indeed, one can argue that the US Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934 provided much of the grist for the deliberations at the Havana 
Conference that crafted the GATT as part of the broader coverage of the International 
Trade Organization. The original GATT contained exceptions for existing preference 
schemes like the British system of imperial preferences (dating back to the Ottawa 
Agreements of 1932) and special tariff arrangements between the United States and Cuba, 
and the United States and the Philippines, as well as the broad most-favored nation (MFN) 
exceptions for free trade areas and customs unions under GATT Article XXIV.5 
Over much of the 60-year history of the GATT-WTO trading system, RTAs have been a 
sideshow in international trade relations, with the notable exception of the agglomeration 
of the European Union. Over the past two decades, however, there has been a sharp in-
crease in bilateral and regional free trade agreements and customs unions, as well as new 
negotiations or proposed talks on what I call “super-regional pacts” – such as the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas, European Union and Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), and 
the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific among others. Some of these initiatives have 
foundered; others potentially pose negotiating alternatives, as well as complements, to the 
Doha Round. 
Throughout the GATT/WTO era, the WTO Secretariat reports that 302 RTAs were noti-
fied under GATT Article XXIV and an additional 22 RTAs under the GATT’s “Enabling 
                                                 
5 The original draft of the GATT covered only customs unions and did not mention FTAs, which were 
added during a substantial rewriting of these provisions at the Havana Conference in 1946–47. See GATT, 
Analytical Index of the GATT: Guide to GATT Law and Practice, 6th ed., Geneva, 1994, 785–788. 
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Clause”. Some RTAs become “inactive” or redundant as regional groupings expand; as a 
result, as of October 2007, only 194 RTAs were currently in force. The total number of 
RTAs in force is actually lower today than at its peak level in 2003. Moreover, there is 
substantial double-counting of RTAs because separate notifications are required under the 
GATS for pacts that cover both goods and services.6 
Care should be taken in drawing general conclusions from this seemingly vast pool of 
agreements, for several reasons. First, the pacts differ widely in terms of content and par-
ticipants; some are comprehensive like the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Rela-
tions Trade Agreement or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), while the 
WTO Secretariat discretely labels others as “partial scope agreements.” The trade impacts 
and implications for the world trading system vary accordingly – so beware comparing 
acorns and oak trees! Second, many of the agreements are part of the agglomeration of the 
European Union over several decades or reflect efforts to reestablish trade ties that for-
merly existed in the socialist bloc among countries that have now returned to a market-
oriented economic system. Third, some of the pacts notified to the WTO attempt to link 
together neighbors with small and fragmented economies; others offer valuable economic 
and political benefits for developing countries in partnerships with the United States, 
European Union, or Japan. 
So is the so-called “FTA Frenzy” exaggerated? Not necessarily. The above totals underes-
timate activity: many pacts are not notified due to weak WTO notification requirements 
(especially for RTAs among developing countries); and there are a large number of initia-
tives under negotiation or under serious study, particularly in East and South Asia which 
has become the hot bed of regionalism in the 21st century. 
Since the turn of the century, the major economies of the Asia-Pacific region have em-
barked on a series of negotiations of RTAs with key trading partners. The United States 
extended its Western Hemisphere-oriented FTA policy to East Asia/Oceania (signing 
pacts with Singapore, Australia, and Korea); China began negotiating with members of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) soon after its accession to the WTO; 
and Japan and Korea entered into RTAs for the first time, adopting the multi-track ap-
proach to trade negotiations long followed by the United States. ASEAN members were 
willing partners in many of these ventures, even as they struggled to deepen economic in-
tegration within their own 10-nation group. In addition, smaller open economies such as 
Singapore, Mexico, and Chile aggressively pursued both regional and trans-Pacific part-
nerships and championed broader Asia-Pacific initiatives to revive momentum toward the 
goal of free trade and investment in the region proclaimed at the meeting of Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders in Bogor, Indonesia in November 1994. 
As I wrote in 2004, regionalism can be a boon or the bane of the world trading system 
(Schott 2004, chapter 1). By design, RTAs are discriminatory and thus conflict with the 
WTO’s fundamental MFN principle. Whether RTAs are on balance trade-creating or 
trade-diverting, however, depends on the terms of the deal and the economic environment 
in which the pact is implemented. 
                                                 
6 Since the WTO entered into force in 1995, about 35 % of the RTAs have had been notified under both 
GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V. 
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There is a vast literature on the impact of RTAs on the multilateral trading system. For the 
purposes of this paper, I will boil the arguments down to what I regard as the most salient 
points. There are four main ways that RTAs can complement and reinforce the multilateral 
trading system: advancing trade liberalization, establishing useful precedents for WTO 
talks, locking in domestic reforms, and bolstering alliances among trading partners. Simi-
larly, there are four main reasons why RTAs may undercut the multilateral system: trade 
and investment diversion, overlapping and conflicting trading rules, attention and resource 
diversion from WTO talks, and bad precedents for other trade accords. The following sec-
tions summarize these arguments. 
6 RTAs as complements to the WTO 
The most important benefit of RTAs is that they seek to reduce participating country trade 
barriers beyond the countries’ current WTO commitments. If they are true to their name, 
RTAs will commit to eliminate barriers on “substantially all” trade between the partner 
countries (some are obviously less perfect in this regard than others). In contrast, WTO 
negotiators pursue incremental reforms in each trade round, leaving substantial barriers in 
place after the accords are fully implemented. The difference can be put simply: RTAs 
achieve deeper cuts in trade protection than WTO reforms but the RTA liberalization is 
accorded to only a few countries, while multilateral agreements are applied on an MFN 
basis to the entire WTO membership. Deeper cuts, but by fewer countries, and applied on 
a discriminatory basis. Advocates of RTAs argue that, on balance, the pacts are trade cre-
ating and spur positive welfare gains for participating countries as well as, over time, for 
third countries due to the stimulus to growth in the RTA region. 
Second, RTAs often create commitments in areas beyond the scope of existing WTO obli-
gations. These “WTO-plus” provisions can set useful precedents for future multilateral 
talks. Indeed, the US-Canada FTA provided useful precedents for the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS), and the US-Chile FTA may provide a template for a WTO 
e-commerce provision. More recent US FTAs with Peru and other countries include sub-
stantive obligations on labor and the environment – areas where the WTO footprint has 
been small but could well expand in the future (see concluding section).7 In these and 
other WTO-plus areas, discriminatory application of RTA rules is possible. However, the 
demands of the marketplace and the costs of applying several different standards push for 
convergence towards a unified set of regulations. 
In addition to setting precedents, RTAs provide a real world classroom to help educate 
trade negotiators. Negotiators learn by doing – it is hard to know the sticking points of a 
problem until one tries to negotiate a solution for it. Such education is invaluable for de-
veloping countries exposed to the rulemaking puzzles presented in talks on services, intel-
lectual property, and other new issues on the WTO agenda. 
                                                 
7 Pursuant to the May 10, 2007 “Bipartisan Agreement” between the Bush administration and the Con-
gress, the US-Peru FTA, signed December 14, 2007, contains extensive provisions on labor that go well 
beyond those in prior US accords. The new labor template is already being emulated and augmented by 
the European Union in its free trade talks with Korea. 
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Third, RTAs “lock-in” domestic policy reform because they raise the cost of policy rever-
sal, if the change violates the terms of the agreement and makes the country potentially 
liable to trade retaliation. In this regard, RTAs help buffer governments from protectionist 
demands that may be politically alluring but economically undesirable. In turn, uncertainty 
about the business and the regulatory environment is reduced, facilitating investment and 
development. 
Fourth, RTAs strengthen relationships among partner countries and help build alliances 
for WTO reforms in areas of common interest. The launch of the Doha Round in 2001 
succeeded in large measure due to the closer trade relations resulting from US and EU 
trade initiatives with Latin American and African countries. 
7 Drawbacks of FTAs 
Part of the perceived advantage of an RTA is receiving preferential access into a partner 
country; such preferences are particularly notable in North-South RTAs because MFN 
trade barriers generally are highest in sectors of export importance to developing countries 
(e. g. textiles, clothing and agriculture). It is also one of the major drawbacks: granting 
preferences to some developing countries discriminates against the trade of others, result-
ing in costly trade (and investment) diversion. The NAFTA caused substantial trade and 
investment diversion in the textiles and clothing sectors from the Caribbean Basin coun-
tries as a result of the preferential treatment accorded Mexican industry. The US African 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) now is having a similar adverse effect on non-
beneficiaries in Africa and elsewhere. In essence, whether via RTAs or unilateral prefer-
ence schemes, industrial countries rob Peter to pay Paul. 
Problems with trade diversion are obvious in theory but less evident in practice. Often, the 
growth impetus from RTA reforms yields net trade creation over time. Indeed, that is the 
robust conclusion for the world’s most prominent RTA, the European Union. Analysis of 
the trade consequences of a RTA – for both partner countries and nonsignatories – can 
only be fully considered after the main reforms have been implemented and the dynamic 
effects of those policy changes have fed through each economy. 
Is there evidence of net trade creation or diversion for RTAs? The results of several stud-
ies are summarized below. We find strong evidence of net trade creation from RTAs and 
very limited instances of trade and investment diversion. Using a gravity model of trade 
and a 30-year data set containing 46 RTAs, DeRosa (2007) found that most RTAs are pre-
dominantly trade creating. Some RTAs in the study were found to be trade diverting, but 
for the most part these RTAs were minor. The major RTAs (i.e., NAFTA, the European 
Union, Mercosur, and the ASEAN) show no signs of trade diversion in the study, provid-
ing clear evidence against one of the main RTA critiques and in favor of a commonly cited 
RTA benefit. 
Evidence against the trade diversion argument is not so clear cut in another recent gravity 
model analysis. In Hufbauer / Schott (2007), a gravity model analysis similar to the one in 
DeRosa (2007) is carried out with an expanded and updated data set. This analysis pro-
vides useful insight into the nature of trade diversion by considering agriculture and manu-
facturing trade flows separately from total trade. For manufacturing and total trade, the 
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results are similar to those reported by DeRosa; only a few agreements indicate trade di-
version. The results for agricultural trade are far different; most of the RTA groupings 
show significant trade diversion in agricultural trade, including major RTAs like the Euro-
pean Union, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and NAFTA.8 Most likely, 
these results are a product of the high MFN barriers in agriculture. As theory and intuition 
suggest, the larger the differential between MFN and preferential barriers, the greater the 
chance for diversion. The results in Hufbauer / Schott (2007), while limited by sector, do 
lend credence, at the very least, to the argument that multilateral liberalization is necessary 
in tandem with RTAs in order to blunt potential trade diversion. 
In addition, Hufbauer and Schott extend their gravity model analysis to foreign direct in-
vestment, and report only limited investment diversion.  The EFTA, the European Union’s 
FTAs, Mercosur, and the South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) are all found to 
lower the amount of investment from members to non-members, corroborating an anti-
RTA argument. However, the story is not entirely negative. The results also show that 
several agreements brought investment from non-members into member countries. The 
US and Mexican portion of NAFTA, for example, stoked investment from non-members 
into member countries by 29 %, most likely due to European and Asian investments in 
Mexico in order to gain access to the lucrative North American market.9 
The second major problem with RTAs is that they can create a web of overlapping and 
inconsistent trade rules (artfully described by Jagdish Bhagwati as a “spaghetti bowl”) that 
complicates global sourcing and raises transactions costs.10 RTA critics specifically take 
issue with rules of origin provisions, which can be particularly distorting. Origin rules are 
blatantly discriminatory, but their overall impact on business is unclear. For origin rules, 
like most aspects of RTAs, the problems are more pronounced in those sectors with high 
MFN protection. Conversely, if MFN barriers are low the protectionist effects of origin 
rules diminish, since importers can simply ignore the RTA rules and abide by MFN rules 
(as sometimes occurs in US-Canada trade). Moreover, as MFN trade barriers go down, the 
value of these rules of origin (reflected in the “margin of preference”) diminishes signifi-
cantly. 
Empirical research is needed to determine how big a problem the “spaghetti bowl” really 
is. Recent work at the Inter-American Development Bank bears mention. Estevadeordal / 
Harris / Suominen (2007) look at 58 RTAs with varying rules of origin. In this study, the 
authors categorize the RTAs in order to understand their divergence from one another. 
They find that there are distinct origin rule “families” or similar styles that usually follow 
continental boundaries. The families do create some convergence regionally, but there is 
still wide divergence worldwide on specific products. According to the study, on average, 
only about one third of all agreements will have identical rules of origin on a given prod-
uct. This corroborates the spaghetti bowl story; however, no attempts to quantify the over-
all dollar impact of the spaghetti bowl have been made. The authors argue that while di-
                                                 
8 In Hufbauer / Schott (2007) some RTAs are grouped together (e. g. Chilean, Mexican, Australian, and 
Singaporean FTAs are identified with the same dummy variable). 
9 In the FDI gravity model analysis in Hufbauer / Schott (2007), NAFTA is divided into its three parts: a 
US-Canada FTA, a US-Mexico FTA, and a Canada-Mexico FTA. 
10 See Bhagwati / Panagariya (1996). 
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vergence is prevalent, the regional similarities provide opportunities for coordination that 
could begin to mitigate the spaghetti bowl effects.11 
Third, RTAs can divert attention away from multilateral negotiations for several reasons. 
First, countries have limited resources to engage in trade negotiations, and RTAs clearly 
limit time that can be spent negotiating multilateral reforms. This problem is particularly 
acute for developing countries, which usually have only a few officials for all trade nego-
tiations. But it can also affect developed countries, whose budgets can be inadequate to 
meet the extensive demands of a proactive, multifaceted trade agenda (see Ambassador 
Robert Zoellick’s letter appended to GAO 2004). Second, some developing countries be-
come less interested in WTO talks after concluding preferential deals with their key trad-
ing partners because they want to preserve their preference margins in partner countries 
from erosion due to MFN trade liberalization in WTO negotiations. Third, RTA critics 
fear that trade diversion caused by RTAs may indirectly cause disengagement from multi-
lateral talks. Trade diversion increases the cost of nonparticipation, inciting third countries 
to attempt to join RTAs or create their own (Baldwin 1993). This concept, dubbed “dom-
ino regionalism” by Richard Baldwin, could fragment the trading system into blocs or 
spur competitive liberalization that complements and reinforces multilateral reforms 
(Bergsten 1996). 
Is this actually the case? Some analysts have claimed that Mexico is less interested in the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) because of the NAFTA and does not want other 
countries to share its access to the United States. However, that argument does not seem to 
hold.  Mexico has pursued FTAs throughout the world precisely because it knows that the 
United States will continue to expand its own roster of preferential partners and that those 
pacts will dilute the value of Mexico’s preferences in the US market anyway. Rather than 
hunkering down within NAFTA, Mexico has fully participated in WTO and FTAA nego-
tiations, and has negotiated a network of FTAs to enhance its status as a destination for 
foreign direct investment to serve other markets within the hemisphere. 
Fourth, RTA critics argue that some accords can set bad precedents for multilateral trade. 
Due to economic and political asymmetries in North-South RTAs, developed country 
partners can push for the inclusion of origin rules or intellectual property protection that 
developing countries may find burdensome to implement and enforce. Others argue that 
RTAs cover subjects that are better dealt with outside the trade arena, such as labor and 
environment. Of course, many believe that coverage of these areas is crucial – for both 
substantive reasons and to bolster domestic political support for the pact in industrial 
countries. 
In sum, RTAs can be, on balance, trade creating or diverting, can build support for or di-
vert attention from multilateral negotiations, can enhance or dilute (or both) negotiating 
resources, and can foster good and bad precedents for other trade initiatives. The overall 
                                                 
11 In this regard, the countries of the Andean region and members of the Central American Common Mar-
ket are now seeking to harmonize the trade regulations embodied in their respective neighborhood ac-
cords and FTAs with the United States. If successful, that negotiation could spark renewed interest in 
some type of broader hemispheric trade pact to substitute for the moribund process seeking a Free Trade 
Area of the Americas. 
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outcome depends on how pacts are crafted, the commitment of the partner countries to the 
WTO system, and how much progress is made in parallel WTO talks. 
As I concluded in Schott (2004), RTAs can contribute to and strengthen the multilateral 
trading system “if their coverage is comprehensive, if origin rules are kept to a minimum, 
and if the members are committed to work together to advance MFN trade reforms in the 
WTO.” However, if the Doha Round goes into hibernation or collapses, then the downside 
risks of RTAs may dominate and erode the vitality (and perhaps the viability) of multilat-
eral initiatives. This “cost of failure” is not well appreciated among WTO ambassadors, 
who have not yet had a trade round fail in their lifetime. 
8 Does regionalism enhance developing country power in the WTO? 
In 1947, the GATT was signed by 23 countries. Today, the WTO has more than 150 
members. For the past six decades, decisions have been taken by consensus. Very few 
matters are subject to a vote, where each member – large or small – has the same weight. 
The consensus rule is likely to continue, even though the WTO decisionmaking process 
has become cumbersome as the number of issues on the WTO agenda and the number of 
participants have proliferated. As a result, “consensus building” has become more impor-
tant for both developed and developing countries in order to produce WTO agreements. 
In the Doha Round, developing countries have played prominent roles in the substantive 
negotiations. In large measure, this activity reflects the size and increasing global engage-
ment of emerging economies like China, Brazil, and India. These three countries account 
for a larger share of global gross domestic product (GDP) than Japan; their combined out-
put in 2006 was roughly equal to one-third of the US GDP.12 Bigger markets mean coun-
tries have more “chips” on the negotiating table. That’s an important reason why member-
ship in the ad hoc steering groups for WTO negotiations shifted over the past two decades 
from the “Quad” (United States, European Union, Canada, Japan) to the “G-4” (United 
States, European Union, Brazil, and India) – though neither iteration has been particularly 
effective. 
Can RTAs enhance the role of developing countries in WTO negotiations? Let me offer a 
two-handed economist’s short answer to this political science inquiry. 
On the one hand, to the extent that RTAs spur productivity and welfare gains in the mem-
ber economies, those countries will likely have a bigger stake in world trade and in WTO 
talks. Regional associations among developing countries also can enhance their capacity to 
participate in WTO negotiations, if members are willing to pool resources and share in-
formation (a good example is the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery). 
On the other hand, RTAs among developing countries do not necessarily add “weight” to 
their members’ influence in WTO matters. It depends whether the country accepts “re-
                                                 
12 To be sure, some smaller developing countries have been active on single issue or sectoral talks (e. g., 
West African cotton exporting nations), but have limited ability to exercise their implicit blocking 
power – unless they are willing to bring the entire multilateral process to a halt. 
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sponsibility” and contributes commensurate to its economic standing in the trading sys-
tem. Brazil has no more leverage as a member of Mercosur than it did in the Tokyo Round 
when it negotiated independently. In contrast, Brazil has more leverage in the Doha Round 
due to its commercial diplomacy and its leadership of the G-20 developing country cau-
cus, formed in the run-up to the Cancún WTO ministerial in September 2003 to promote 
substantial liberalization of agricultural protection and deep cuts in US and European farm 
subsidies. 
9 Reinforcing the multilateral trading system: What needs to be done? 
The problems of the Doha Round and the proliferation of regionalism confront WTO 
members with a central challenge: how to make the multilateral trading system more rele-
vant and more effective in addressing obstacles to the free flow of goods, services, and 
capital, and in promoting sustainable development.13 Like its members, the WTO as an 
institution must respond to globalization pressures and adapt its work to fit changing con-
ditions in world markets. This will require changes in the way the WTO works and with 
whom it works. In this concluding section, I outline three broad and inter-related chal-
lenges facing the WTO: “Multilateralize Multilateralism”; “Multilateralize Regionalism”; 
and “Modernize Multilateralism.” 
I. Multilateralize Multilateralism 
The fundamental obligations of the WTO are most-favored nation treatment (MFN) 
and national treatment embodied in GATT Articles I and III. However, there are a 
vast number of exceptions that take the WTO far away from the ideal of a universal 
system with a single set of rules. 
The exceptions can be classified in five main categories: import remedies (antidump-
ing and countervailing duties; general import and balance of payments safeguards); 
regulatory exceptions (including general exceptions in Article XX and national secu-
rity controls in Article XXI); RTAs and plurilateral agreements (of which the gov-
ernment procurement agreement is the most notable); developing country prefer-
ences (embodied in Part IV of the GATT and in “special and differential” prefer-
ences for developing countries included in all WTO accords); and in carve-outs ne-
gotiated in the national schedules of each WTO member country. Taken together, it 
is hard to say that “multilateral” = “MFN”!! 
That said, WTO members would do well to fill many of the holes in the MFN gaps 
cited above. The broad exceptions in Article XX and XXI deserve priority attention 
because security and environmental problems pose new challenges to the WTO sys-
tem. 
 
 
                                                 
13 This challenge is discussed in the context of African regionalism by Draper / Qobo (2007). 
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II. Multilateralize Regionalism 
As noted in earlier sections of this paper, RTAs will continue to proliferate regard-
less of the outcome of the Doha Round. The challenge is to make the design and im-
plementation of RTAs more WTO-friendly (see, for example, Baldwin / Thorton 
2008). The vast literature on this subject offers a multitude of proposals; most are 
theoretically sound but flawed in terms of political economy considerations – in 
other words, they are easier to discuss than to negotiate and legislate. 
In terms of design, policymakers often extol the merits of “open regionalism”, 
though there is no consensus regarding the practical application of this concept. 
Some equate open regionalism with unconditional MFN; others envisage a reciproc-
ity requirement (e. g., extending the benefits to non-member countries on the same 
conditions as the charter members when those countries are ready to accept the RTA 
obligations). In this way, current members cannot forestall the dilution of RTA pref-
erences as the membership expands, and the RTA thus does not become a substitute 
for multilateral initiatives (and indeed will eventually approximate a global accord). 
The problem is that legislative bodies that ratify RTAs seldom like to issue “blank 
checks” for free access to their markets. That is why accession clauses, if included in 
RTAs, are seldom invoked. 
Rules of origin have been a central focus of RTA reformers, since these provisions 
not only complicate global trade but also dilute the scope of liberalization in RTAs 
by making some types of transactions ineligible for trade preferences. In terms of de-
sign, the best approach to origin rules is to avoid industry-specific provisions and to 
minimize domestic content requirements. Cumulating origin rules across RTAs 
makes clear economic sense, but runs afoul of the political lobbies that insisted on 
the restrictive origin rules in the first place, and thus will likely fail when big trading 
powers are involved. 
All these proposals are second best: if one wants to reduce the distortions caused by 
rules of origin, the best solution is to cut MFN tariffs and thus reduce the margin of 
preference for RTA members. A variant of that approach would be for WTO obliga-
tions to require that RTA members harmonize and lower the MFN tariffs (say over a 
10-year period) down to the level of the lowest rate applied by any of the RTA 
members, so that there is a complementarity in the regional and multilateral reform 
efforts. Note, however, that negotiators faced rigid opposition in both the Uruguay 
Round and the Doha Round to proposals that would increase the substantive re-
quirements for RTAs under GATT Article XXIV. The economist’s potion is castor 
oil to politicians! 
As a practical matter, WTO members may find the most immediate payoff is im-
proving transparency of RTAs. Indeed, the Doha Round already has made some pro-
gress in this area. In December 2006, the WTO General Council approved a new 
“Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements” that is being imple-
mented on a provisional basis pending completion of the Doha negotiations. The 
main objective of this accord is to get countries to notify the WTO when they are 
negotiating RTAs and then supplement that notice with details about the pact once it 
is signed. In that regard, the new mechanism requires that RTA members notify 
“changes affecting the implementation of an RTA” as soon as possible after they 
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occur, and submit a final report on the completion of the implementation of the pact. 
These submissions will alert WTO members when RTA preferences, or RTA provi-
sions such as rules of origin, are modified, and afford members the opportunity for 
additional consultations on the RTA. 
III. Modernize Multilateralism 
Like generals, trade negotiators often fight the last war. Such myopia is clearly evi-
dent in the Doha Round and cause of much of its distress. Going forward, the WTO 
agenda will have to better address changing conditions in world markets, including 
the growing concerns about global warming, and address more directly the critiques 
in both developed and developing countries against the WTO and its evil twin, 
“GATTzilla”! 
Modernizing the WTO will require a healthy dose of institutional reform. Key areas 
that should be addressed include the decision-making process (which should main-
tain the WTO’s consensus rule but revamp the process of consensus building as sug-
gested in Schott / Watal (2000); reform of the dispute settlement procedures in an-
ticipation of an increased caseload on “gray area” legal issues; surveillance (already 
begun with the provisional application of new RTA transparency rules); and the role 
of parliamentary and nongovernmental organizations (in response to the sometimes 
confused debate about the WTO’s “democratic deficit”). 
Going forward, the WTO also will have to adapt its substantive agenda to the new 
demands of globalization and the political imperatives of sustaining coalitions in 
support of multilateral initiatives. WTO rules on taxes and subsidies need to be re-
cast to meet the new challenges of global warming and to respond to demands that 
the definition of subsidy (and thus the scope of permitted countervailing measures 
against distorting or prohibited subsidies) be made infinitely elastic to cover con-
cerns about currency manipulation, regulatory abuse or neglect, and labor market 
practices. In addition, WTO members will have to address trade and security link-
ages before pre-shipment inspection and visa requirements become major obstacles 
to international flows of goods, services, and people. The WTO needs to establish 
overarching disciplines before national or regional initiatives begin to establish de 
facto norms. To be sure, this will create tension between those seeking “policy co-
herence” versus those resisting “agenda overload.” 
Because many of these subjects require negotiation into areas beyond the expertise 
and competencies of trade officials, the WTO will have to collaborate more effec-
tively with other international economic organizations. The biggest challenge will be 
working with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank on interre-
lated trade, finance, exchange rate, and development issues (particularly the nascent 
“Aid for Trade” programs). National governments and international organizations 
have long tried and failed to develop coherent policies that cover these cross-cutting 
issues – though they have issued a large number of hortatory declarations. Also 
daunting will be the task of balancing trade and environmental objectives, now that 
the latter has grown to climatic proportions, since it is not clear what body would be 
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the obvious interlocutor on the environmental side.14 And, despite the ideological ob-
jections and practical concerns of developing countries, the trade and labor issue will 
have to be joined, building on the constructive principles on labor rights and condi-
tions of work developed over the past decade or two in the International Labor Or-
ganization. 
In other words, the trading system in the 21st century must be re-engineered. The 
WTO’s legal architects effectively sought to restore the structural integrity of the In-
ternational Trade Organization that emerged from the Havana Conference of 1946–
47. Their plan was flawed…not because it wasn’t ambitious but because it was not 
ambitious enough. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Esty (1994) anticipated this need in his prescient study and proposed the creation of a Global Environ-
mental Organization. 
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